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Abstract
This paper examines how inﬂation taxation aﬀects resource allocation and welfare in a neo-
classical growth model with leisure, a production externality and money in the utility function.
Switching from consumption taxation to inﬂation taxation to ﬁnance government spending reduces
real money balances relative to income, but increases consumption, labor, capital and output. The
net welfare eﬀect of this switch depends crucially on the strength of the externality and on the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution: While it is always negative without the externality, it is
likely to be positive with a strong externality and elastic intertemporal substitution.How inﬂation taxation aﬀects resource allocation and welfare has received a great deal of atten-
tion. So far, this debate has been controversial. Most studies claim that inﬂation taxation reduces
welfare regardless of whether money demand is derived from a cash-in-advance constraint, from
a transaction technology with money as an intermediate input, or from real money balances in
the utility function (e.g. Friedman, 1969; Kimbrough, 1986; Prescott, 1987; Cole and Stockman,
1992; Schreft, 1992; Gillman, 1993; Gomme, 1993; Correia and Teles, 1996; Dotsey and Ireland,
1996; Aiyagari, Braun and Eckstein, 1998; Wu and Zhang, 1998, 2000; Lucas, 2000; and Erosa and
Ventura, 2002). In many of these studies, the optimal rule of money growth is to generate a degree
of deﬂation such that the nominal interest rate, i.e. the opportunity cost of holding money, equals
zero as described by the Friedman rule.
On the other hand, some studies support a rate of money growth for a positive nominal inter-
est rate by considering additional factors. In Phelps (1973), Braun (1994) and Palivos and Yip
(1995), inﬂation taxation leads to higher welfare than income taxation as a means of public ﬁnance.
Guidotti and Vegh (1993) derive optimal inﬂation taxation with increasing returns to scale in the
transaction-cost technology. Shi (1999) supports an optimal money-growth rate in excess of the
Friedman rule by assuming borrowing constraints. In Rebelo and Xie (1999), money does not aﬀect
production in the steady state but can alter it during the transition toward the steady state; and
the transitional eﬀect can be exploited by monetary policy to improve welfare if there is a produc-
tion externality. Most of these studies have fully inelastic labor supply, and ignore externalities
that are nevertheless prevalent in the real world. It remains to be seen how money growth aﬀects
welfare with both a production externality and a labor-leisure trade-oﬀ. As shown in Turnovsky
(2000), the inclusion of an endogenous labor-leisure trade-oﬀ leads to fundamental changes in the
economy’s equilibrium structure as there is an equilibrium growth-leisure trade-oﬀ.
In this paper we examine how nominal money growth as a means of public ﬁnance aﬀects
resource allocation and welfare in a neoclassical growth model with leisure, a production externality
and money in the utility function. For simplicity, we assume that government spending is a ﬁxed
fraction of output and is not valued by private agents. The government may also tax consumption
to ﬁnance its spending, unlike Phelps (1973), Braun (1994) and Palivos and Yip (1995) where they
1compare an income tax with the inﬂation tax. Individuals allocate income to consumption and
investment in both capital and real money balances, and allocate time to labor and leisure.
In this environment, switching from consumption taxation to inﬂation taxation drives up the
cost of holding money, and thus reduces the demand for real money balances relative to income as
is well known in the literature. Also well known is that economizing on money holdings accelerates
the circulation of money. Further, the decrease in real money balances reduces the marginal beneﬁts
of consumption and leisure with a nonseparable utility function concerning these augments, which
tends to reduce consumption and leisure. However, the rise in the nominal money growth rate
has no direct eﬀect on the cost of leisure (the real wage), and therefore leisure should decline and,
accordingly, labor should increase. The increased labor in turn raises the marginal product of
capital and stimulates capital accumulation, leading to higher output per capita.1
On the other hand, the accompanying decline in the consumption tax rate also lowers the cost of
consumption, tending to raise consumption. Given the standard constant elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (CEIS) form of the utility function in the literature on economic growth, the net eﬀect
on the ratio of consumption to output is zero. Thus, as output rises with the nominal money
growth rate, so does consumption. The rise in output also works against the decline in the ratio of
real money balances to output in the determination of the eﬀect of faster nominal money growth
on the level of real money balances. As a consequence, there are opposing eﬀects of the switch
from consumption taxation to inﬂation taxation on welfare: The increase in consumption tends to
raise welfare but the decline in leisure tends to reduce welfare. How real money balances respond
to the tax switch also aﬀects welfare. The net eﬀects of the tax switch on real money balances and
welfare depend crucially on whether production externalities are taken into consideration.
First, consider the case that has no externality where the concern about monetary policy focuses
mainly on the beneﬁt and cost of holding money. In the spirit of the Friedman rule, since the
social cost of producing money is zero, there should be a negative inﬂation tax such that the cost
of holding money (the nominal interest rate) can be as close to zero as possible. As a result, the
optimal inﬂation tax is negative along with a positive consumption tax, but the underlying nominal
money growth rate should exceed the rate that corresponds strictly to the Friedman rule because
2of the tax distortions on leisure, output and consumption.
Now consider the case with a production externality in the form of learning-by-doing and
knowledge spillovers. In addition to the consideration above, we know that the private rate of return
on capital investment must be lower than the social rate due to the externality, which implies that
agents hold too little capital compared to the social optimum. Because of the under-investment in
capital, the private rate of return on labor must also be lower than the social rate, which implies
that agents have too much leisure and too little labor compared to the social optimum. The new
consideration is that we want agents to hold more capital, which can be achieved by applying a
higher inﬂation tax in order to induce them to switch out of real money balances into capital. The
positive eﬀects of the switch to inﬂation taxation on labor, capital investment and output help the
economy correct the under-investment in capital and may thus improve welfare.
We ﬁnd two key factors in the determination of the relative strength of the opposing eﬀects of
the tax switch on welfare. First, a stronger production externality strengthens the positive welfare
eﬀect, other things equal. Second, since the positive eﬀect of the switch to inﬂation taxation on
output takes time to reach its full potential through promoting capital accumulation, the relative
strength of the positive welfare eﬀect also depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
More elastic intertemporal substitution accelerates growth and hence strengthens the positive wel-
fare eﬀect. We show that when output can fully adjust in the long run, the net welfare eﬀect of
switching from consumption taxation to inﬂation taxation can be positive so long as the externality
is strong enough. However, when considering the entire equilibrium path in a tractable AK model
with a strong enough externality for endogenous growth, a positive net welfare eﬀect of this tax
switch also requires the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to be suﬃciently high.
The avenue through which inﬂation taxation aﬀects production and welfare in this model diﬀers
from those in the related work mentioned above. By reducing the consumption tax, raising the
inﬂation tax to ﬁnance a given government ﬁscal commitment can stimulate production in the
long run in our model, as opposed to the long-run neutrality of money growth in Rebelo and Xie
(1999) without a consumption tax. The diﬀerence originates mainly from the diﬀerent assumptions
concerning labor supply (elastic in our model but fully inelastic in their model). If labor supply
3were fully inelastic in our model, then switching from consumption taxation to inﬂation taxation
would have no real eﬀect on consumption and production in the long run.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the model and characterizes the
equilibrium. Section 2 presents results without sustainable growth in the absence of any externality
or in the presence of a weak production externality. Section 3 derives results with a strong enough
production externality for sustainable growth. We separate these cases because the analytical
approaches diﬀer between cases with or without sustainable growth. Section 4 discusses brieﬂy
what may happen with cash-in-advance constraints. The last section concludes. Proofs of results
will be relegated to the Appendix.
1. THE MODEL
We consider an economy populated by identical inﬁnitely-lived households with measure one.
The representative household is endowed with one unit of time which is allocated to leisure lt and
labor 1 − lt. There is no uncertainty in the form of shocks in preferences and technology.2
1.1 Production
A single ﬁnal good is produced by using capital Kt and labor 1 − lt according to the following
technology
Yt = AKα
t (1 − lt)
1−α ¯ K
ψ
t , 0 < α < 1, 0 < ψ ≤ 1 − α, (1)
where Yt is ﬁnal output, A is total factor productivity, and α measures the importance of capital
relative to labor in production. Average capital ¯ Kt exhibits spillovers of degree ψ.3 As is well
known, when ψ = 1 − α the externality is strong enough to generate sustainable growth, whereas
when 0 < ψ < 1 − α the model becomes a neoclassical growth model without long-run growth.
Factors are compensated according to their marginal products:
wt = A(1 − α)K
α+ψ
t (1 − lt)−α, (2)
rt = AαK
α+ψ−1
t (1 − lt)1−α, (3)
where wt is the real wage rate and rt is the real interest rate. For simplicity we ignore capital
depreciation until we consider numerical solutions with sustainable growth in Section 3.
41.2 Household


















dt, δ > 0, θ > 0, η ≥ 0,  > 0 (6= 1), δ + θ + η = 1, (4)
where Ct is real consumption; Mt is real money balances; lt is leisure; ρ is the constant rate of time
preference; δ, θ and η measure the importance of consumption, real money balances, and leisure,
respectively; and 1/ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
With a consumption tax at a ﬂat rate τc, the household budget constraint is given as:
(1 + τc)Ct = wt(1 − lt) + rtKt − ˙ Kt − ˙ Mt − πtMt, (5)
where Kt is the capital asset and πt ≡ ˙ Pt/Pt refers to the inﬂation rate. A dot on the top of a
variable represents its rate of change with respect to time. The product πtMt is the amount of the
inﬂation tax.4 Denoting Bt ≡ Kt + Mt, we can rewrite (5) as
˙ Bt = wt(1 − lt) + rtKt − (1 + τc)Ct − πtMt. (6)
The household chooses consumption Ct, leisure lt, and real money balances Mt to maximize











+ λt[wt(1 − lt) + rtKt − (1 + τc)Ct − πtMt] + νt(Bt − Kt − Mt),
























− λtπt − νt = 0, (8)
∂H
∂Kt







t )1− − λtwt = 0, (10)
∂H
∂Bt
= νt = ρλt − ˙ λt. (11)
5The transversality condition ruling out the Ponzi game is given by
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλtBt = 0. (12)
According to these conditions, the marginal gain in utility of each choice variable should equal
its marginal loss. In particular, a higher inﬂation cost of holding money induces households to
economize on real money balances in (8), other things equal.
These ﬁrst-order conditions imply the following relationships:
[1 − δ(1 − )]
˙ Ct
Ct
− θ(1 − )
˙ Mt
Mt
− η(1 − )
˙ l
l









Equation (13) links consumption growth to real money growth, leisure growth, and the gap between
the real interest rate and the rate of time preference. In (14) and (15), the optimal levels of
consumption, real money balances, and the forgone wage income (leisure times the wage) are
proportional to one another given (τc,π,r), due to the homothetic CEIS utility function.
1.3 Government
The government uses a consumption tax and money issuing (seignorage revenue or an inﬂation
tax) to ﬁnance a government purchase Gt that is not valued by private agents. Throughout the
paper, we abstract from income taxation because it is dominated by consumption taxation in
this type of model. We assume that government spending is a ﬁxed fraction β of ﬁnal output,
i.e. Gt = βYt with β > 0, in the spirit of Ramsey. The task of the government is to select the
welfare-maximizing rates of the consumption and inﬂation taxes to ﬁnance the required government





= Gt = βYt, β > 0, (16)
where ¯ Mt is nominal money supply and ˙ ¯ Mt/Pt is seignorage revenue.
61.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is characterized by the wage and interest rate equations, the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions of the household problem, the budget constraints of the household and the government, the
time constraint between leisure and labor, and the overall resource constraint Ct + Gt + ˙ Kt = Yt.
For analytical convenience, we transform the key variables (C,M,K) into their ratios to output
(ΓC,ΓM,ΓK) in the system of equations determining the equilibrium. Also denote the growth rates
˙ X/X for X = C,K,M,l as gX, and the growth rate of nominal money supply as σ. We then have






η(1 + τc)ΓC(1 − l)
δ(1 − α)
, (19)
(1 + τc)ΓC = 1 − gKΓK − gMΓM − πΓM, (20)
τcΓC + σΓM = β, (21)
ΓC + gKΓK = 1 − β. (22)
From (20)-(22), we have
gM = σ − π, (23)
which says that the growth rate of real money balances gM equals the growth rate of nominal
money supply σ minus the inﬂation rate π.
In what follows, we shall investigate three cases. The ﬁrst case has no externality, i.e. ψ = 0,
allowing us to link our work to the literature. In the other two cases we assume 0 < ψ < 1−α and
ψ = 1 − α, respectively, so that we can study the implications of the production externality. We
call 0 < ψ < 1 − α a weak externality case and ψ = 1 − α a strong externality case. In the cases
with 0 ≤ ψ < 1 − α there is no sustainable growth, whereas in the case with ψ = 1 − α there is
sustainable growth.
72. RESULTS WITHOUT SUSTAINABLE GROWTH
We ﬁrst derive equilibrium solutions and results in the cases that have no externality or a weak
production externality, i.e. 0 ≤ ψ < 1 − α. In order to avoid the complexity in tracking down
transitional dynamics, we only focus on the steady-state equilibrium in these cases. The steady-
state equilibrium solution is derived in a few steps. First, it is obvious to have π = σ, that is,
without long-run growth in output, the rate of inﬂation is just equal to the rate of nominal money
growth.
Setting ˙ C = ˙ M = ˙ l = 0 and substituting (3) into (17), we obtain r = AαKα+ψ−1(1−l)1−α = ρ.
As the real interest rate r is equal to the rate of time preference ρ without sustainable growth in
output, the steady-state capital-labor ratio can be determined as






According to this, the capital-labor ratio is increasing with (independent of) the quantity of labor in
equilibrium with (without) the production externality. Also, nominal money growth can only aﬀect
the capital-labor ratio indirectly through the quantity of labor in the presence of the externality.
The solution for the ratio of consumption to output is given by
ΓC = 1 − β. (25)
For a given β, increasing the rate of nominal money growth, accompanied by decreasing the con-
sumption tax rate for a balanced government budget, will have opposing eﬀects on the ratio of
consumption to output. According to (25), the net eﬀect is zero.
The solution for the ratio of real money balances to output is
ΓM =
θ
δ(ρ + σ) + σθ
. (26)
As expected, the ratio of real money balances to output is certainly decreasing with the rate of
nominal money growth because a higher nominal money growth rate raises the cost of holding
money (the nominal interest rate) by increasing the inﬂation rate.
The solution for leisure is found to be
l∗ =
η(ρ + σ)
η(ρ + σ) + (1 − α)[δ(ρ + σ) + σθ]
. (27)
8It is easy to verify that leisure is decreasing with the rate of nominal money growth. Consequently,
labor supply is increasing with the ratio of nominal money growth.
According to (24) and (27), the steady-state level of capital K∗ = k∗(1 − l∗) should also be










, ψ ∈ [0,1 − α). (28)
In this equation, the level of output is an increasing function of the quantity of labor, after we
substitute capital stock out using AαKα+ψ−1(1 − l)1−α = ρ. Since labor is increasing with the
rate of nominal money growth, so must be the steady-state level of output regardless of whether
the externality is absent (ψ = 0) or present (0 < ψ < 1 − α). The case with sustainable growth
(ψ = 1 − α) will be analyzed separately later.
Using (21), (25) and (26), we have the budget-balance restriction on the policy parameters:
β =
τcδ(ρ + σ)
(1 + τc)[δ(ρ + σ) + σθ]
+
σθ
δ(ρ + σ) + σθ
, (29)
which implies that τc = {β[δ(ρ + σ) + σθ] − σθ}/{(1 − β)[δ(ρ + σ) + σθ]}.
Further, the velocity of money V is positively related to the rate of nominal money growth or
inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, by the identity ¯ MV = PY , the income velocity of money can be expressed
as V = Y/( ¯ M/P) = Y/M = 1/ΓM in this model. Since the ratio of real money balances to output
ΓM is decreasing with the rate of nominal money growth, the velocity of money, V = 1/ΓM, must
be increasing with the rate of nominal money growth.
We give the eﬀect of inﬂation taxation on resource allocation below and put the proof in the
Appendix.
Proposition 1: In the steady state with β > 0 and 0 ≤ ψ < 1 − α, switching from consumption
taxation toward inﬂation taxation reduces leisure and the ratio of real money balances to income,
but increases consumption, labor, capital, output, and the velocity of money. Also, the tax switch
reduces real money balances for ψ = 0 but may increase it for a large ψ ∈ (0,1 − α).
The results in Proposition 1 can be explained as follows. Holding government spending as a
ﬁxed fraction of output, a reduction in the consumption tax rate goes hand-in-hand with a rise
9in the nominal money growth rate for a balanced government budget. The consequent rise in the
inﬂation rate with π = σ drives up the cost of holding money in (8), and thus reduces the demand
for real money balances relative to income, as is well known in the literature. Also well known is
that economizing on money holdings accelerates the circulation of money. Moreover, the decrease in
real money balances reduces the marginal beneﬁts of consumption and leisure with a nonseparable
utility function concerning these augments, which tends to reduce consumption and leisure as can
be seen in (7) and (10). However, this rise in the rate of nominal money growth has no direct eﬀect
on the cost of leisure (the real wage), and therefore, leisure should decline and, accordingly, labor
should increase. The increased labor in turn raises the marginal product of capital, and hence
stimulates capital accumulation and raises output. Since consumption is equal to output net of
government spending in the steady state with ˙ K = 0, the switch from consumption taxation to
inﬂation taxation also raises steady-state consumption.
When the rate of nominal money growth rises along with a falling consumption tax, there are
two opposing eﬀects on the level of real money balances: a positive one through the rise in output
and a negative one through the fall in the ratio of real money balances to output. In the absence
of any externality, the positive eﬀect through the rise in output is weak and is dominated by the
negative one, resulting in a net decline in real money balances. With a suﬃciently strong production
externality, however, the rise in output caused by faster nominal money growth can be substantial
and may dominate the negative eﬀect on real money balances, leading to a possible net increase in
the level of real money balances.
It is important to note that the real eﬀect of a higher nominal money growth rate (accompanied
by a lower consumption tax rate) on resource allocation in this model originates from endogenous
labor supply. If labor supply were fully inelastic, then the real eﬀect of switching from consumption
taxation to inﬂation taxation on consumption and output would disappear.
To examine the welfare eﬀect of inﬂation taxation, we now derive the solution for the welfare




t = Y δ+θΓδ
CΓθ
Mlη, we obtain the solution
10for the welfare level by substituting (25)-(28) into (4): U∗ = Φ[F(τc,σ)]
1− /(1 − ), where
F(τc,σ) ≡
(ρ + σ)δ+η(1 + τc)−δ[δ(ρ + σ) + θσ]
ψ(δ+θ)
1−α−ψ






















The welfare level U∗ is a function of the rates of the consumption tax and nominal money growth
via the function F, while Φ > 0 is a constant and independent of the consumption tax and nominal
money growth. The welfare level U∗ refers to the steady state equilibrium when capital and output
fully adjust to a permanent policy change in the long run. Also, note that U∗ is monotonically
increasing with F. We thus focus on F in the welfare analysis below, with or without the production
externality.
2.1 No Externality
In the absence of any externality (ψ = 0), the welfare level in (30) reduces to
Fo(τc,σ) ≡
(ρ + σ)δ+η(1 + τc)−δ
η(ρ + σ) + (1 − α)[δ(ρ + σ) + σθ]
. (31)
The government chooses the tax rates (τc,σ) to maximize welfare in (31) subject to (29), holding
government spending as a ﬁxed fraction β of output. We proceed in two stages. First, we look at
regimes where the government uses either consumption taxation or inﬂation taxation but not both.
Second, we consider their mix.
In the case with consumption taxation only, we have τc = β/(1 − β) from (29) and
Fo(τc) =
ρ−θ(1 − β)δ
η + δ(1 − α)
,
where the assumption θ + η + δ = 1 has been used to simplify the expression.
Analogously, when inﬂation taxation is the only option, we have σ = βδρ/[θ(1 − β) − βδ ] and
Fo(σ) =
(ρθ)−θ(1 − β)δ+η[θ(1 − β) − βδ]θ
η + δ(1 − α)
.
Intuitively, in order to use seignorage revenue to ﬁnance the required government spending, the
taste parameter for real money balances θ must be large enough relative to the ratio of government
11spending to output β and to the taste parameter for consumption δ. The exact restriction on
these parameters can be found as follows. First, the government budget balance with the inﬂation
tax as the sole means is σΓM = β. Using the solution for ΓM, this budget balance restriction
becomes σθ/[δ(ρ + σ) + σθ] = β. In this equation, the ratio of seignorage revenue to output (the
left-hand side) is increasing with the rate of nominal money growth σ and achieves its maximum at
σ = ∞: θ/(δ+θ). This maximum ratio of seignorage revenue to output less the ratio of government
spending to output equals [θ(1−β)−βδ]/(δ+θ). Therefore, θ > βδ/(1−β) is essentially a necessary
condition for inﬂation taxation alone to ﬁnance the required government spending. We thus make
this as an assumption. Under this assumption, there is an upper limit on the ratio of government
spending to output β which in turn sets an upper limit on the rate of nominal money growth or on
the rate of inﬂation by π = σ.
We compare the two regimes in terms of welfare below. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 2: In the steady state without any externality and with β > 0 and θ > βδ/(1 − β),
using pure consumption taxation to ﬁnance government spending obtains a higher welfare level than
using pure inﬂation taxation.
By Proposition 2, inﬂation taxation leads to a lower welfare level than does consumption taxa-
tion as a sole means of ﬁnancing government spending in the long run. What happens when both
instruments are used together? The answer is given below, with the proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 3: In the steady state without any externality and with β > 0, if both consumption
taxation and inﬂation taxation are used to ﬁnance government spending, their optimal mix to
maximize welfare has the following features: τ∗
c > β/(1 − β) and σ∗ = π∗ < 0.
By Proposition 3, when there is no production externality, the rate of nominal money growth
should be negative and the consumption tax should be positive. The intuition is as follows. Since
real money balances and consumption enter the utility “symmetrically”, there is a “uniform taxation
principle” saying that the government should tax both at the same rate in order to avoid distorting
the margin between consumption and real money balances. See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) for
more discussions on the uniform taxation principle. This consideration implies that the rates of
12consumption and inﬂation taxes should be equal. However, real money balances are also an asset,
and ideally the government also does not want to distort the return on money relative to the return
on capital so as to avoid distorting the margin between real money balances and capital. Since
capital income is not taxed in our model, this consideration implies that the inﬂation tax should
be zero. Combining the consumption-money consideration with the capital-money consideration
suggests that, in the absence of any externality, the consumption tax should exceed the inﬂation
tax. Moreover, in the spirit of the Friedman rule, because the social cost of producing money is
zero, there should be a negative inﬂation tax such that the cost of holding money (the nominal
interest rate) can be as close to zero as possible. As a result, the optimal inﬂation tax is negative
along with a positive consumption tax. However, the underlying nominal money growth rate should
exceed the rate that corresponds strictly to the Friedman rule, because of the distortions of the
consumption tax and the negative inﬂation tax on leisure and consumption.
Further, can inﬂation taxation improve on the case without any government intervention (with
a zero nominal-money growth rate, no government spending, and no taxes) in welfare terms? We
design a template to answer this question as follows. Suppose that we start with the no-government
case, i.e. β = τc = σ = 0. Then, we allow for inﬂation taxation and spend seignorage revenue on
subsidizing consumption. That is, there exists a function τc(σ) such that τcΓC = − σΓM, which
reduces to τc = − σθ/[δ(ρ + σ) + σθ]. Inserting this relationship that balances the government
budget into Fo(τc,σ) to obtain Fo(τc(σ),σ), we increase the rate of nominal money growth from
zero, leading to a subsidy on consumption τc < 0, and see what happens to welfare Fo(τc(σ),σ).
The result is given below and the proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 4: In the steady state without any externality and with β = 0, raising the inﬂation
tax from zero to subsidize consumption reduces welfare from the level of a competitive equilibrium
with no government intervention. The optimal monetary policy should generate deﬂation (π∗ < 0).
As stated in Propositions 2-4, in the absence of the production externality, inﬂation taxation
always reduces welfare, whether it is used alone or along with consumption taxation, or whether
there is a required public purchase or a consumption subsidy. In essence, as the rate of nominal
money growth rises along with a falling consumption tax rate, the losses in welfare arising from the
13decreases in leisure and real money balances dominate the gain in welfare arising from the increase
in consumption.
The quantitative implications of the results are illustrated in Table 1, using numerical solutions
based on the parameterization α = 0.3, A = 0.3, ρ = 0.03, θ = 0.1,  = 3.0, η = 0.3, and ψ = 0.
The values of α, ρ and  are in line with those widely used in the literature, while the values of
other parameters are chosen such that the numerical results for the key variables of interest are
plausible. To make a welfare comparison across all cases in Table 1, we ﬁrst select a benchmark case
and then compute the percentage change in income in the benchmark case such that we reach the
same welfare level in each of the other cases (see the note in Table 1 for this equivalent payment).
The ﬁrst case (the benchmark case) in Table 1 has no government intervention. In the sec-
ond case, either or both of consumption taxation and inﬂation taxation may be used to ﬁnance
government spending as 10% of output (β = 0.1). When both instruments are used, their op-
timal mix is a positive consumption tax and a negative inﬂation tax (a deﬂation transfer at a
rate of nominal money growth −2.04%), implying higher real money balances than in the bench-
mark. Compared to the benchmark case regarding real allocation and welfare, this optimal mix
has higher leisure but lower levels of steady-state capital and output, and achieves a welfare gain
in the magnitude of 2.87% of the benchmark income. The reason for this welfare gain is a reduced
nominal interest rate (the opportunity cost of holding money) under the negative inﬂation tax,
r + σ = ρ + σ = 3% − 2.04% = 0.96%. Note that this nominal interest rate exceeds what the
Friedman rule suggests (i.e. a zero nominal interest rate), because of the distortion on leisure and
consumption. When the consumption tax is used alone to ﬁnance government spending as 10% of
output (at a tax rate 11.11%), there is no real eﬀect on the allocation of time and output. This
is because with the CEIS utility function the positive substitution eﬀect of the consumption tax
on leisure is fully oﬀset by its negative income eﬀect when government spending is not valued by
private agents.6 Since government spending is wasted, the consumption tax reduces welfare from
the no-intervention benchmark case in the magnitude of 8.64% of income. When the inﬂation tax
is used alone, there is a greater loss in welfare compared to the no-intervention case (21.86% of
income) because the inﬂation tax (at a 6% nominal money growth rate) reduces both leisure and
14real money balances.
2.2 A Weak Production Externality
With a weak production externality ψ ∈ (0,1 − α), we ﬁrst compare pure inﬂation taxation
with pure consumption taxation as in Proposition 2. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 5: In the steady state with β > 0 and θ > βδ/(1 − β), if ψ ∈ (0,1 − α) is large
enough, then using pure inﬂation taxation to ﬁnance government spending obtains a higher welfare
level than using pure consumption taxation.
In addition, we investigate whether inﬂation taxation can improve on pure consumption taxation
as in Proposition 3. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 6: In the steady state with β > 0, when consumption taxation is used to ﬁnance
government spending, inﬂation taxation (π∗ = σ∗ > 0) should also be used together if ψ ∈ (0,1−α)
is large enough.
Further, we explore whether inﬂation taxation can improve on the case without any government
intervention as in Proposition 4. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 7: In the steady state with β = 0, if ψ ∈ (0,1−α) is large enough, then increasing the
inﬂation tax rate from zero to subsidize consumption increases welfare from the level of a competitive
equilibrium without any government intervention.
Unlike the results in Propositions 2 to 4, inﬂation taxation can raise welfare in Propositions 5 to
7 with a strong enough production externality, whether it is used alone or along with consumption
taxation, or whether there is a required government purchase or a consumption subsidy. This result
diﬀers from that in Rebelo and Xie (1999) in two aspects. First, in their study it is unclear whether
the rate of nominal money growth should be positive. Second, with the same type of production
externality, the optimal monetary policy arises from its real eﬀects on the steady-state equilibrium
in our model, but it emerges from its transitional eﬀect in their model.
Why does the welfare consequence of inﬂation taxation depend on whether we take the pro-
duction externality into account? Intuitively, when there is a production externality, the private
15rate of return on investment in capital is lower than the social rate, leading to under-investment
in capital. When the level of capital is below its socially optimal level, the private rate of return
on labor must also be lower than the social rate, leading to a suboptimal solution with too little
labor and too much leisure. Therefore, the positive eﬀects of the inﬂation tax on labor and capital
accumulation help the economy correct the under-investment in capital and the under-supply of
labor. This possibility is further enhanced by another interesting ﬁnding in Proposition 1: With a
strong enough externality, the rise in the inﬂation tax may raise real money balances, rather than
reduces it as in the no-externality case. Thus, the rise in the inﬂation tax can improve welfare
when the externality is strong enough such that the welfare gain from increasing consumption and
possibly real money balances dominates the welfare loss from decreasing leisure. This mechanism
through which we support inﬂation taxation diﬀers from those in the related literature.
For quantitative insights, we conduct a numerical analysis of the model with a weak production
externality ψ ∈ (0,1 − α) and report the results in Table 2. The degree of the externality is set at
ψ = 0.5 ﬁrst and then 0.58 (below the value of 1−α = 0.7). In the former case, the welfare ranking
in a descending order is: the mix of consumption taxation and inﬂation taxation, consumption
taxation alone, and inﬂation taxation alone. In the latter case with a stronger externality, the mix
remains the best, while the ranking of the other two is reversed.
Table 3 reports the numerical results with no government purchase, i.e. β = 0, using otherwise
the same parameterization as in Table 2. The mixed case has a higher welfare level than the
no-intervention case in Table 3. Also, the inﬂation tax is positive and the consumption tax is
negative in their optimal mix. In other words, with a strong enough production externality, using
an inﬂation tax to subsidize consumption obtains a higher welfare level than having no intervention
at all. When ψ = 0.58, for example, the inﬂation tax (at a rate 3.169% of nominal money growth)
obtains a gain in welfare by a magnitude of 6.11% of income and raises long-run output by almost
25% (from 40.79 to 49.57), both of which are substantial.
3. RESULTS WITH SUSTAINABLE GROWTH
With ψ = 1 − α, the model becomes the well known Romer’s model (1986) in which the
externality is so strong that growth is sustainable even in the long run. As is also well known, this
16type of model has no transitional dynamics. That is, the growth rate is constant at all points in
time and shared by output, capital, consumption, and real money balances, while labor, leisure and
the ratios of consumption and investment to output are all time-invariant. With these features,
we can obtain the solution for the system of equations implicitly on the entire equilibrium path as
follows.
Setting gl = 0 in (17) and gC = gM = g, we have:
g =
r − ρ
1 − (1 − η)(1 − )
, (32)
which implies
r = ρ + [1 − (1 − η)(1 − )]g ≡ R(g). (33)
Note that the coeﬃcient on g is positive since η ∈ (0,1) and  > 0. Thus, the function R(g) is
increasing with the growth rate g.
Substituting (33) into (3) gives






Since R0(g) > 0, there is an equilibrium growth-leisure trade-oﬀ as in Turnovsky (2000).
In addition, setting gM = g in (23) leads to
g = σ − π. (35)







η[ρ + σ − (1 − η)(1 − )g][1 − αg/R(g)]
(1 − α){θσ + δ[ρ + σ − (1 − η)(1 − )g]}
, (36)
which determines the growth rate g implicitly. Once the growth rate is obtained, we can determine
the inﬂation rate, π = σ − g, as well as the following ratios:













The ratio of capital investment to output is g Γ K = αg/R(g).
17According to (33), the factor g/R(g) can be rewritten as 1/[1 − (1 − η)(1 − ) + ρ/g], which is
obviously increasing with the growth rate g. With this observation, the growth rate of output is
positively associated with the ratio of capital investment to output g Γ K = αg/R(g), and negatively
associated with the ratio of consumption to output Γ C in (37). These relationships reﬂect a typical
trade-oﬀ between current and future consumption. According to (38), the relationship between the
growth rate g and the ratio of real money balances to output Γ M is ambiguous in general. Also,
the solution for leisure l is given by (34), while the policy parameters (τc,σ) satisfy (21).
We now demonstrate how a switch from consumption taxation to inﬂation taxation under a
balanced government budget aﬀects resource allocation and the growth rate of output below. The
proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 8: Given β > 0 and ψ = 1 − α, if ρ is suﬃciently small, then switching from
consumption taxation with σ near zero to inﬂation taxation to ﬁnance government spending reduces
leisure and the ratio of consumption to output and raises the growth rate of output.
As mentioned earlier, the growth rate is decreasing with both leisure and the fraction of output
spent on consumption. Therefore, when the switch from consumption taxation to inﬂation taxation
reduces both leisure and the fraction of output for consumption as in the previous case, it accelerates
economic growth in the present case with sustainable growth.
Further, given the solution for (ΓC,ΓM,l,g) and the initial capital stock K0, the solution for







(1 − )[ρ − (1 − η)(1 − )g]
. (39)
The expression of U in (39) measures the lifetime utility of the representative household on the
entire equilibrium path from the moment that a permanent policy change is implemented. That
is, a change in U captures both the short-run and long-run eﬀects of a policy change on welfare.
Unfortunately, because there is no reduced-form solution for (g,l,ΓC,ΓM), it is diﬃcult to conduct
a welfare analysis of government policy in the same way as in the previous section. We will instead
use a numerical approach to investigate the welfare eﬀect of inﬂation taxation below.
18The numerical analysis here diﬀers from the ones in Section 2 in at least two aspects. First, since
the present case with sustainable growth (ψ = 1 − α) does not display transitional dynamics, the
entire equilibrium path (from the moment that the policy change is implemented) can be studied
numerically, by solving the nonlinear equations that characterize the equilibrium. By contrast,
in the previous case without sustainable growth (ψ ∈ (0,1 − α)), we only analyzed the long-run
steady-state equilibrium to avoid the complexity in tracking down the transitional dynamics. When
considering the entire equilibrium path, there is a diﬀerence in time at which the various eﬀects
of a policy change reach their full strength. For example, leisure and the ratio of consumption to
output fall immediately to their new solutions after a permanent rise in the inﬂation tax (a fall in
the consumption tax) in this model with sustainable growth. In contrast to the immediate decline
in leisure and in the ratio of consumption to output, the levels of capital and output will only
rise gradually over time after this policy switch, which will eventually raise future consumption.
In this adjustment process after the switch to inﬂation taxation, there is a trade-oﬀ between a
current welfare loss from the decline in leisure and current consumption and a future welfare gain
from the rise in future consumption. Therefore, when we consider the entire equilibrium path,
we expect that the net welfare eﬀect of switching from consumption taxation to inﬂation taxation
will depend on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution measured by 1/. This is because more
elastic intertemporal substitution (lower ) typically leads to faster consumption growth ˙ C/C in
(32), other things equal, as households are more willing to trade a current welfare loss for a future
welfare gain.
Second, in order to generate realistic values for the output growth rate and the real interest rate,
we need to introduce capital depreciation at a rate ξ. With capital depreciation, the real interest rate
equation becomes r = αA(1−l)1−α−ξ, and the resource constraint becomes C +G+ ˙ K +ξK = Y.
The equilibrium analysis with capital depreciation is similar to the one with no depreciation.
The numerical solutions with sustainable growth and capital depreciation are reported in Table
4. In this table, we increase the rate of nominal money growth exogenously and let the consumption
tax rate fall to balance the government budget. In so doing, the consumption tax rate and the
amount of leisure decline quickly, while the inﬂation rate and the growth rate of output all increase.
19The net welfare eﬀect of this acceleration in nominal money growth is indeed dependent on the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1/. When  = 0.40 (high elasticity), the welfare-maximizing
nominal money growth rate is equal to 2.2%, leading to a positive inﬂation rate. When  = 3.0
(low elasticity), the welfare-maximizing nominal money growth rate is equal to -3.2%, leading to
deﬂation. Because the nominal interest rate in the latter case is still positive, r + π = 7.01% −
4.87% > 0, the welfare-maximizing nominal money growth rate is still greater than the one that
follows the Friedman rule.
4. DISCUSSION OF EXTENSION
Finally, our present model does not include cash-in-advance constraints. If money is introduced
into our model through cash-in-advance constraints instead of through money in the utility function,
we have obtained the following results.5 First, when there is no sustainable growth with ψ ∈
[0, 1 − α), the steady-state equilibrium level of labor or leisure is independent of both the level
of government spending and the division between consumption taxation and inﬂation taxation.
Second, when there in no sustainable growth with ψ ∈ [0, 1 − α), a switch from consumption
taxation to inﬂation taxation reduces the steady-state capital stock and welfare if both consumption
and investment are subject to the cash-in-advance constraint, but has no eﬀect on them if the cash-
in-advance constraint is only imposed on consumption. This result is consistent with the ﬁnding
in Stockman (1981) that assumes ﬁxed labor supply and treats seignorage revenue as lump-sum
transfers. Third, when there is sustained growth (ψ = 1−α), switching from consumption taxation
to inﬂation taxation will have no eﬀect on resource allocation and welfare if the cash-in-advance
constraint is only imposed on consumption as in the case without sustainable growth. However,
when both consumption and capital investment are subject to the cash-in-advance constraint, we
ﬁnd numerically that the switch to inﬂation taxation reduces labor, the output growth rate and
welfare.
Overall, whether the results will change when we take cash-in-advance constraints into account
depends crucially on whether investment is subject to this cash-in-advance constraint. If this
cash-in-advance constraint only restricts consumption spending, then there is no additional eﬀect
of a switch from consumption taxation to inﬂation taxation. However, if the cash-in-advance
20constraint also applies to capital investment spending, the additional eﬀects of the tax switch on
real allocation and welfare are of the opposite signs compared to what we have found with money
in the utility function. The key reason for this result is that when the cash-in-advance constraint
applies to the purchase of capital, the complementarity between money and capital investment built
in this constraint implies that the eﬀects of an inﬂation tax on real money balances and capital
accumulation are both negative. By contrast, with money in the utility function, there exists a
trade-oﬀ between real money balances and capital. Thus, one should interpret our results with
caution.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper considers a neoclassical growth model with leisure and money in the utility function
and with government spending as a ﬁxed share in output and ﬁnanced by seignorage revenue and/or
consumption taxation. We study the eﬀects of switching from consumption taxation to inﬂation
taxation on resource allocation and welfare. Concerning resource allocation, we ﬁnd that the switch
to inﬂation taxation decreases leisure and the ratios of consumption and real money balances to
income, but increases the levels of consumption, capital and output in the long run. With a strong
production externality, the positive output eﬀect of the switch to inﬂation taxation may lead to
a positive net eﬀect on the level of real money balances. In the case with sustainable growth
originating from a strong enough production externality, the switch from consumption taxation to
inﬂation taxation is likely to promote economic growth.
The welfare eﬀect of switching from consumption taxation to inﬂation taxation is conditional
on the strength of the production externality and on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
In the absence of the externality, the switch to inﬂation taxation is always welfare reducing. With
a strong enough production externality and with inelastic intertemporal substitution, the welfare-
maximizing policy is a negative inﬂation tax and a positive consumption tax, but the underlying
nominal money growth rate exceeds the rate that follows the Friedman rule due to tax distortions on
labor and consumption. With a strong enough production externality and with elastic intertemporal
substitution, however, switching from consumption taxation to inﬂation taxation may raise welfare
by correcting the under-investment of capital and the under-supply of labor.
21APPENDIX Proposition Proof of Proposition 1: First, from M = ΓMY , there are opposing
eﬀects of a higher rate of nominal money growth on the level of real money balances (a decline in
ΓM and a rise in Y ). Using this equation and (26)-(28) to substitute out (ΓM,Y ) and diﬀerentiating
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[δ(ρ + σ) + θσ]{η(ρ + σ) + (1 − α)[δ(ρ + σ) + θσ]}
> 0,
that is, dM/dσ > 0. Second, from C = ΓCY , knowing that dY/dσ > 0 and dΓC/dσ = 0 in our
earlier discussion, we have dC/dσ > 0. All the other results in this proposition follow our earlier
discussion.





(1 − β)η[θ(1 − β) − βδ]θ ≡ B(β).
Obviously, we have: (i) B = 1 at β = 0, and (ii) B0 > 0. These two results establish B > 1 for
β > 0. Therefore, the claim holds.
Proof of Proposition 3: Using the welfare function Fo(τc,σ) in (31), we deﬁne the La-
grangian of the government maximizing welfare by choosing (τc,σ) subject to its budget constraint
(29) as:
L = Fo + µ

τcδ(ρ + σ)
(1 + τc)[δ(ρ + σ) + σθ]
+
σθ












(1 + τc)2[δ(ρ + σ) + θσ]
= 0. (A1)
22In order to see whether inﬂation taxation can contribute additionally to the value of the problem,
i.e. whether sign ∂L/∂σ > 0, it is convenient to start with pure consumption taxation where
τ∗
c = β/(1 − β) and σ∗ = 0. If ∂L/∂σ < 0 at τ∗
c = β/(1 − β) and σ∗ = 0, then there should be
deﬂation σ∗ = π∗ < 0 and accordingly τ∗
c > β/(1 − β). At this starting point τ∗
c = β/(1 − β) and
σ∗ = 0, we have Fo/µ = (1 − β)/δ and Fo > 0 by using the deﬁnition of Fo and (A1).
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[δ(ρ + σ) + θσ]2(1 + τc)
.




= sign {−θ(1 − α)} < 0 at τ∗
c = β/(1 − β) and σ∗ = 0.
The claim follows.
Proof of Proposition 4: As discussed earlier, we start with σ = τc = β = 0 and then
increase the inﬂation tax rate (the nominal money growth rate) subject to τc = − σθ/[δ(ρ+σ)+θσ].
Under this constraint of the government budget balance without government spending (β = 0), the
solution for the welfare level in (31) becomes
Fo(τc(σ),σ) =
δ−δ(ρ + σ)η[δ(ρ + σ) + θσ]δ
η(ρ + σ) + (1 − α)[δ(ρ + σ) + θσ]
.
The sign of dFo/dσ at σ = τc = 0 is given by: [η + (1 − α)δ ](η + δ + θ) − [η + (1 − α)(δ + θ)] =
− θ(1 − α) < 0. Thus, the optimal rate of the inﬂation tax should be negative.
Proof of Proposition 5: Recall that using pure consumption taxation to ﬁnance government










Similarly, with pure inﬂation taxation, σ = βδρ/[θ(1 − β) − βδ] and τc = 0, we have
F(σ) =
(ρθ)−θ(1 − β)δ+η[θ(1 − β) − βδ]θδ
ψ(δ+θ)
1−α−ψ




23The ratio of the two welfare levels is deﬁned as
F(τc)
F(σ)
= (1 − β)−η

θ
θ(1 − β) − βδ
θ 
η(1 − β) + δ(1 − α)




Here, it is obvious that H(0) = 1. The remaining proof of H < 1 is to show H0 < 0 for β > 0 and
for a large enough ψ. The sign of H0 is determined by η/(1−β)+θ(θ +η)/[θ(1−β)−βδ]−η(1−
α − ηψ)/{(1 − α − ψ)[η(1 − β) + δ(1 − α)]}. Clearly, as ψ → 1 − α from below (suﬃcient but not
necessary), sign H0 → − ∞ < 0 under β > 0 and θ > βδ/(1 − β).
Proof of Proposition 6: Paralleling the proof of Proposition 3, we use the welfare function
(30). We also deﬁne the Lagrangian of the government maximizing welfare by choice of (τc,σ)
subject to its budget constraint (29) as:
L = F + µ

τcδ(ρ + σ)
(1 + τc)[δ(ρ + σ) + σθ]
+
σθ












(1 + τc)2[δ(ρ + σ) + θσ]
= 0. (A2)
Starting with pure consumption taxation where τ∗
c = β/(1−β) and σ∗ = 0, we have F/µ = (1−β)/δ
and F > 0 by using the deﬁnition of F and (A2). At this point, we ask whether accelerating
nominal-money growth can contribute additionally to the value of the problem, i.e. whether sign
∂L/∂σ > 0 as in the proof of Proposition 3. If ∂L/∂σ > 0 at τ∗
c = β/(1 − β) and σ∗ = 0, then
σ∗ = π∗ > 0.
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.




= sign {(1 − η)ψ θ[η + δ(1 − α)] − δθ(1 − α)(1 − α − ηψ)} at τ∗
c = β/(1 − β) and σ∗ = 0.




→ sign θη(1 − α)(1 − η) > 0.
Clearly, ψ → 1 − α is suﬃcient (but not necessary) to generate ∂L/∂σ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 7: Paralleling the proof of Proposition 4, we start with σ = τc = β = 0
and then increase the inﬂation tax rate subject to the government budget balance τc = − σθ/[δ(ρ+
σ) + θσ]. Consequently, the solution for the welfare level F(τc,σ) in (30) becomes
F(τc(σ),σ) =
(ρ + σ)ηδ−δ[δ(ρ + σ) + θσ]
ψθ+δ(1−α)
1−α−ψ




The sign of dF/dσ at σ = τc = 0 is given by: [η + (1 − α)δ]ψθ(1 − η) − (1 − α − ηψ)δθ(1 − α)
→ θη(1 − α)(1 − η) > 0 as ψ → 1 − α (suﬃcient but not necessary).
Proof of Proposition 8: We begin with consumption taxation and raise the nominal money
growth rate from a starting value near zero. Diﬀerentiating (36) yields ∂g/∂σ = Ω1/Ω2, where
Ω1 ≡
θ[ρ − (1 − η)(1 − )g]
[ρ + σ − (1 − η)(1 − )g]{θσ + δ[ρ + σ − (1 − η)(1 − )g]}
,
Ω2 ≡






θσ(1 − η)( − 1)
[ρ + σ − (1 − η)(1 − )g]{θσ + δ[ρ + σ − (1 − η)(1 − )g]}
.
Since the transversality condition implies that ρ−(1−η)(1−)g > 0, we have Ω1 > 0. As a result,
the sign of ∂g/∂σ is the same as that of Ω2. The ﬁrst term of Ω2 is positive since η ∈ (0,1),  > 0
and R(g) = r > 0; the second term is negative since R(g) − αg = R(g)(ΓC + β) > 0 according
to (37); and the last term is close to zero when σ starts with a value near zero (either positive or
negative). Thus, the sum of these three terms is positive if ρ is suﬃciently small (suﬃcient but not
necessary). From (33), (34), (37), and (38), a positive growth eﬀect of a higher nominal money
growth rate (accompanied by a lower consumption tax rate) implies negative eﬀects of the same
policy change on both leisure and the ratio of consumption to output.
25Footnotes
1. This positive long-run relationship between inﬂation and output is in line with some previous
predictions (e.g., Tobin, 1965; van der Ploeg and Alogoskouﬁs, 1994; Espinosa-Vega and Yip,
1999). Empirical evidence in this regard is mixed. In low inﬂation countries, a permanent
rise in the inﬂation rate permanently raises the level of output in the postwar era as found
by Bullard and Keating (1995). However, there is no such a permanent positive eﬀect of
inﬂation on output in high inﬂation countries in both Bullard and Keating (1995) and Bruno
and Easterly (1998).
2. In other words, our model abstracts from how optimal monetary policy should respond to
such shocks, which has been examined in some studies; see e.g. Williamson (1996) and Rebelo
and Xie (1999, Section 4).
3. The rationale for the externality is that ﬁrms and workers enhance their knowledge through
learning-by-doing, which also beneﬁts other ﬁrms through spillovers to some extent as knowl-
edge is partly a public good in nature (e.g. Arrow, 1962). Moreover, Arrow’s idea of linking
learning-by-doing to investment builds on the evidence of strong positive eﬀects of experience
on productivity, and on evidence that patents — a proxy for learning — closely follow invest-
ment in some industries; see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 147). More recent evidence
also supports the idea of the spillovers both within and across industries (e.g. Bernstein and
Nadiri, 1989; Nakanishi, 2002).
4. With endogenous labor supply, government debt is welfare reducing as shown in Burbidge
(1983), and is hence omitted for simplicity.
5. The results are derived from the same CEIS utility function nesting a Cobb-Douglas rela-
tionship between leisure and consumption (excluding money by setting θ = 0), the same
production function, and a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption expenditure, or on
investment expenditure as well. Also, government spending is assumed as a ﬁxed fraction of
output.
266. From (27), we get l∗ = η/(η + δ(1 − α)) when σ = 0. However, if tax revenue is made as
lump-sum transfers to households, rather than wasted, the consumption tax raises leisure and
reduces output.
27TABLE 1
Numerical Results: No Externality
Parameters: α = 0.3, A = 0.3, ρ = 0.03, θ = 0.1,  = 3.0, η = 0.3, ψ = 0.0
Cases Consumption Money Leisure Capital Output Welfare Equivalent
tax rate % growth % payment %
τc σ l K Y U
No Government Spending: β = 0.0
No intervention 0.000 0.000 0.417 2.802 0.280 -118.715 Benchmark
With Government Spending: β = 0.1
Mix 71.66 -2.04 0.524 2.284 0.228 -114.100 +2.87
Cons tax only 11.11 0.000 0.417 2.802 0.280 -134.714 -8.64
Money only 0.000 6.000 0.391 2.924 0.292 -167.678 -21.86
Note: Equivalent payment refers to Hicksian-equivalent payment, measured by the percentage change
in income we should add to (+) or subtract from (−) the benchmark income to reach the same welfare
level as in any other concerned case.
TABLE 2
Numerical Results: Weak Externality with Government Spending
Parameters: α = 0.3, β = 0.1, A = 0.3, ρ = 0.03, θ = 0.1,  = 3.0, η = 0.3
Cases Consumption Money Leisure Capital Output Welfare Equivalent
tax rate % growth % payment %
τc σ l K Y U
ψ = 0.50
1. Mix 8.310 0.550 0.411 38.229 3.823 -3.64244 Benchmark
2. Cons tax only 11.11 0.000 0.417 36.840 3.684 -3.65677 -0.28
3. Money only 0.000 6.000 0.391 42.757 4.276 -3.92165 -5.14
ψ = 0.58
1. Mix 2.350 3.170 0.397 495.7 49.57 -0.11619 Benchmark
2. Cons tax only 11.11 0.000 0.417 407.8 40.79 -0.12624 -5.76
3. Money only 0.000 6.000 0.391 522.8 52.28 -0.11781 -0.99
Note: Equivalent payment is deﬁned in the note of Table 1.
28TABLE 3
Numerical Results: Weak Externality without Government Purchase
Same parameterization as in Table 2 except β = 0.0
Cases Consumption Money Leisure Capital Output Welfare Equivalent
tax rate % growth % payment %
τc σ l K Y U
ψ = 0.50
No intervention 0.00 0.000 0.417 36.84 3.685 -3.22247 Benchmark
Mix -2.52 0.550 0.410 38.23 3.823 -3.20984 +0.28
ψ = 0.58
No intervention 0.00 0.000 0.417 407.9 40.79 -0.11125 Benchmark
Mix -7.89 3.169 0.397 495.7 49.57 -0.10239 +6.11
Note: Equivalent payment is deﬁned in the note of Table 1.
TABLE 4
Numerical Results with Sustainable Growth (ψ = 1 − α)
Parameters: α = 0.3, β = 0.1, ρ = 0.03, θ = 0.1, ξ = .06, η = 0.3, ψ = 1 − α
Money Consumption Inﬂation Leisure Output Interest Welfare Equivalent
growth rate % tax rate % rate % growth % rate % payment %
σ τc π l g r U
Strong intertemporal substitution  = 0.40 (A = 0.45)
0.000 14.92 -1.61 0.355 1.608 3.93 35.8822 -4.93
1.000 9.36 -0.84 0.342 1.841 4.07 36.5018 -0.97
2.200∗ 6.15 0.22 0.335 1.978 4.15 36.6526 Benchmark
4.000 3.80 1.92 0.329 2.079 4.21 36.5279 -0.81
6.000 2.47 3.86 0.326 2.137 4.24 36.2732 -2.44
Weak intertemporal substitution  = 3.00 (A = 0.65)
-3.40 71.28 -4.84 0.470 1.437 6.51 - 47.9902 -0.74
-3.20∗ 51.69 -4.87 0.439 1.669 7.01 - 47.5013 Benchmark
0.000 13.75 -2.12 0.371 2.121 8.09 - 54.2081 -9.01
2.000 9.22 -0.18 0.362 2.181 8.24 - 57.2055 -12.44
5.000 5.81 2.77 0.355 2.228 8.35 - 60.7703 -16.14
Notes: a. “∗” indicates the welfare-maximizing nominal money growth rate.
b. Equivalent payment is deﬁned in the note of Table 1.
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